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CoN'rs
BROWN V. COMMONWEALTH: THE COURT BALKS ON
QUOTIENT VERDICTS
A fundamental principle underlying the system of trial by jury is
the premise that the verdict returned by the jury should be the result
of a process of careful examination, reflection, and deliberation.-
The fact that this process is considered essential to the attainment of
justice, however, makes it no less frustrating or time-consuming for
the members of the jury. Consequently, over the years juries have
resorted to a number of methods for shortening the deliberative
process.2 Not surprisingly, most of these methods are far better suited
to the attainment of an expeditious verdict than a sound one, and they
are, therefore, widely condemned. One such method is the quotient
verdict. Like the courts of many jurisdictions, 3 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals has had to deal with the problems presented by quotient
verdicts on numerous occasions in both civil and criminal cases.
Unfortunately, the Kentucky Court has demonstrated a less enlightened
approach to these verdicts than have the courts of other states. 4 In
Brown v. Commonwealth,5 the Court recently reasserted its traditional
position on quotient verdicts, 6 a position which clearly separates this
state from the more progressive jurisdictions, and which, in view of
recent legislation, need no longer persist.
An understanding of quotient verdicts is best achieved by con-
sidering three areas, of analysis: (1) the nature and validity of quotient
verdicts; (2) the rationale for and against the use of quotient verdicts;
and (3) the relationship of quotient verdicts to verdicts by lot, with
I See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Marshall, 158 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1942); Comment,
Impeachment of Jury Verdicts by Jurors: A Proposal, 1969 ILL. L.F. 388, 392.
2 See Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 360 (1958).
3 In addition to Kentucky; Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas have particularly
extensive histories of dealing with quotient verdicts. See Security Mutual Fin.
Corp. v. Harris, 261 So.2d 43 (Ala. 1972); Copeland v. State, 41 So.2d 390 (Ala.
1949); Harris v. State, 2 So. 2d 431 (Ala. 1941); Stone v. State, 135 So.2d 646
(Ala. 1931); Ledbetter v. State, 85 So. 581 (Ala. App. 1920); National Credit
Corp. v. Ritchey, 477 S.W.2d 488 (Ark. 1972); Connelly v. State, 350 S.W.2d 298
(Ark. 1961); Arnold v. State, 238 S.W. 818 (Ark. 1921). Speer v. State, 198 S.W.
113 (Ark. 1917); Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971);
Phillips v. State, 216 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1949); Central Motor Co. v.
Gallo, 94 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Brassell,
173 S.W. 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
4 Florida, as will be seen, appears to be the most progressive of the jurisdic-
tions and Arkansas the least progressive. Kentucky decisions correspond more
closely to the Arkansas position than to that of Florida.
5490 S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1973).
6 The Kentucky Court's stance is that the quotient method of arriving at a
verdict may be used as long as the verdict reached by use of the quotient is sub-
sequently and independently adopted by all the members of the jury. Brown v.
Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 731 (Ky 1973); Stone v. Commonwealth, 418 S.W.2d
646 (Ky. 1967); Graham v. Commonwealth, 221 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1949).
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emphasis on the manner in which Kentucky has historically con-
fronted this question.
I.
A quotient verdict is one wherein the members of the jury, having
already determined the guilt or innocence of the defendant or the
liability of the parties, 7 agree to arrive at the sentence, fine, or award
by the use of a simple mathematical operation. Each juror writes
down or orally submits what he believes to be the proper amount of
damages or number of years of confinement, the individual figures
are added up, the sum is divided by the number of jurors, and the
resulting quotient is returned by the jury as its verdict." The invalidity
of quotient verdicts, in almost every jurisdiction, derives from the
agreement by the jurors in advance of the calculation to be bound by
its results.9 There are, however, two notable exceptions to this general
rule. The first exception is peculiar to the state of Arkansas, where
the validity of quotient verdicts is determined by the presence or
absence of a requisite degree of chance.10 The second exception
arises from the recent Florida case of Malone v. Marks Brothers
Paving Co.1 wherein the court, perhaps marking the way for a
Quotient verdicts appear with almost equal regularity in civil and criminal
cases, and, historically, the same rules have been applied to both situations.
For example, although Louisville & N. R.R. v. Marshall, 158 S.W.2d 137 (Ky.
1942), is a civil case, the statute construed therein was section 271 of the Ken-
tucky Criminal Code and many of the decisions relied upon by the Court were
criminal cases. The practical difference of course, is that in civil cases quotient
verdicts are employed to determine the amount of damages to be awarded,
whereas in criminal cases they are used as a means of fixing the length of the
defendant's sentence or the amount of his fine.
If a differential application of quotient verdict standards is to be made, a
strong case can probably be construed in favor of requiring closer scrutiny and
stricter rules in criminal cases than in civil cases. In the latter, the risks involved
can be calculated in dollars and cents; in the former they are most often measured
in years of confinement in a penal institution. There is no reason why this dis-
tinction, the importance of which is manifested in other areas of criminal and
civil procedure, should not be recognized in this context as well. Still, as is
illustrated hereinafter, there is little justification for permitting quotient verdicts
or other averagg techniques in either type of case, and the application of dif-
ferent standad thereto would at best represent only a partial solution to the
problem.8 Comment, Trial Practice-Juries-Quotient Verdicts, 9 Apx. L. RIv. 77
(1955).
9 Wheat v. State, 202 So.2d 65 (Ala. App. 1967); Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Marshall, 158 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1942); Haarberg v. Schneider, 117 N.W.2d 796
(Neb. 1962); Thompson v. State, 270 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. 1954); Brown v. State,
475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
10 See National Credit Corp. v. Ritchey, 477 S.W.2d 488 (Ark. 1972); Speer
v. State, 198 S.W. 113 (Ark. 1917).
11(168 So.2d 753 (Fla. App. 1964). In this case the jurors all stated that
they had employed the averaging device to arrive at a figure but that there wvas
no agreement beforehand to abide by the results. The jury did, however, submit
(Continued on next page)
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future trend in this area, ruled that the use of any averaging technique
in moving the jury toward a verdict would serve to vitiate that verdict
despite the absence of an advance agreement by the jurors to be
bound by the result.
A further refinement of the general rule involves the degree of
participation in the advance agreement necessary to render the
verdict invalid. In most cases involving invalid quotient verdicts all
the jurors have entered into the advance agreement, but such com-
plete participation is not always required. Quotient verdicts have
been set aside where only a majority of the jurors agreed in advance
to be bound;'- where two or more jurors were so bound;' 3 and even
where it was shown that only one juror felt bound by the prior
agreement.
14
Neither must the advance agreement always be expressed in order
to vitiate a verdict resulting from the use of the quotient method. If
it is shown that there was an implied agreement 5 or a tacit under-
standing 0 among the jurors prior to the calculation that they would
be bound by the results, this will serve to void the subsequent verdict.
It has been suggested that the Malone case 17 in Florida can be ex-
plained in terms of the "implied agreement" concept.18 It should be
noted, however, that, unlike other "implied agreement" cases, Malone
turns not upon whether the calculation was preceded by an agree-
ment among the jurors but rather upon whether such a calculation
was employed at all. It is, therefore, misleading to consider Malone
any more representative of "implied agreement" quotient verdict cases
than it is of the "express agreement" cases.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that, under certain cir-
cumstances, the quotient method may be employed without producing
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the quotient thus derived as its verdict. In declaring the verdict invalid, the
Court reasoned that:
not only is the so-called technical quotient verdict condemned, but any
such irregular methods of arriving at a verdict as aggregating or averaging
for the reason that such verdicts do not represent the independent opinion
of each juror and this undermines and circumvents the deliberative
process underlying the jury system. Id. at 756.
.
2 Harris v. State, 2 So.2d 431 (Ala. 1941); Sylvester v. Casey, 81 N.W. 455
(Iowa 1900).
13 Benjamin v. Helena Light & Ry., 255 P. 20 (Mont. 1927).
14 Gordon v. Trevarthan, 34 P. 185 (Mont. 1893); Wright v. Union Pac. R.R.,
62 P. 317 (Utah 1900); Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Brassell, 153 S.W. 522 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1915).
1' Thompson v. State, 270 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. 1954).
16Ledbetter v. State, 85 So. 581 (Ala. App. 1920); Sylvester v. Casey, 81
N.W. 455 (Iowa 1900); Becker v. Mollenaur, 234 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950).
'7 168 So.2d 753 (Fla. App. 1964).
18 Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 335, 351 (1966).
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an invalid verdict. In fact, in the great majority of instances where
the quotient method has been used by a jury the eventual verdict has
been declared valid. 19 This may occur, notwithstanding Malone,
whenever there is
no previous agreement that the average estimate to be arrived at
shall be binding and this plan of deliberating is adopted merely for
the purpose of achieving a working basis, which the jurors are free
to accept or reject as they see fit ... 20
In such cases the final verdict is not technically a quotient verdict,
and it is valid "whether it be for a sum which is the average of the
amounts fixed or for some other amount."
2 1
A second situation in which the use of the quotient method does
not usually result in an invalid verdict occurs when the jury agrees in
advance to be bound by the quotient but decides, after the quotient
has been calculated, to abandon it, and subsequently arrives at a
different verdict.22 This does not mean that an otherwise invalid
quotient verdict can be "cured" by simply rounding off or otherwise
insignificantly changing the quotient.23 On the contrary, in most cases
"[t]he fact that the jury agreed to a slightly different verdict than the
quotient arrived at cannot cure the evil effects of such a verdict, if it
appears that the agreement made in advance entered into or induced
the result."2 4 When the jury clearly refuses to abide by the advance
agreement, however, and adopts a final verdict sufficiently different
from the quotient, such a verdict has been held valid 2 5
In Kentucky, a third rationale for allowing the use of what other-
wise would be invalid quotient verdicts is recognized. Since a true
quotient verdict technically should remove the necessity of any
deliberation or acceptance after the quotient has been reached, the
19 Do not confuse the quotient method with the quotient verdict. As will be
seen, the quotient method (i.e.) the actual mathematical calculation) is used under
many circumstances without resulting in a quotient verdict.
20 Copeland v. State, 41 So.2d 390, 392 (Ala. 1949); accord, Lazarte v. City
of Mountain Brook, 248 So.2d 153 (Ala. 1971); Clark v. Commonwealth, 257 S.W.
1035 (Ky. 1924); Haarberg v. Schneider, 117 N.W.2d 796 (Neb. 1962); Thompson
v. State, 270 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. 1954).
21Copeland v. State, 41 So.2d 390, 392 (Ala. 1949).
22Wheat v. State, 202 So.2d 65 (Ala. App. 1967); Cox v. Commonwealth, 74
S.W.2d 346 (Ky. 1934); Davis v. State, 419 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967)
(by implication).
23 Security Mut. Fin. Corp. v. Harris, 261 So.2d 43 (Ala. 1972); Stone v.
State, 135 So. 646 (Ala. 1931); Ledbetter v. State, 85 So. 581 (Ala. App. 1920);
Benjamin v. Helena Light & Ry., 255 P. 20 (Mont. 1927).
24 Stone v. State, 185 So. 646, 647 (Ala. 1931).
25 See Wheat v. State, 202 So.2d 65 (Ala. App. 1967); Cox v. Commonwealth,
74 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. 1934).
[Vol. 62
CO~nMETS
Kentucky Court of Appeals has ruled that if, after deriving the
quotient, the jury "considers the sum thus obtained, and agrees that
the sum shall be the verdict of the whole jury, it is then a valid
verdict and not a quotient verdict."26 This argument was pursued to
the extreme in Bennett v. Commonwealth= in which the Court noted
that after the calculation "the result reached by the method employed
was as fully assented to and agreed upon by each juror as if the
method had not been employed"2s and incredibly concluded that
"[t]he verdict is the same as would have been reached by the jury
without the method."29 Although the Kentucky Court of Appeals
has not adopted such reasoning in recent cases, it continues to maintain
that a quotient verdict which is "subsequently and independently
adopted by all members of the jury.. ."30 will not be set aside.
It must be remembered, however, that this method of removing
the illegality from quotient verdicts is not widely accepted outside
Kentucky.31 In the majority of jurisdictions it is rejected as a "mere
ratification of a verdict arrived at in an improper manner."32 Rather
than being viewed as a redeeming act of deliberation on the part of
the jury, this procedure has been chastised as merely evidencing "a
continued willingness to adopt an improper method for determining
the extent of liability."33
II.
The predominant argument raised in objection to quotient verdicts
is that they offend a basic principle of our legal system. 34 The
quotient verdict
is condemned by the rules of the common law on the ground that
it is reached in a manner not contemplated when provision was
made for the trial of cases by a jury. On the contrary, it was then
intended that the conclusion of the body should be reached after a
thorough consideration of the law and testimony heard at the
20 Commonwealth v. Anderson, 14 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Ky. 1929).
27 194 S.W. 797 (Ky. 1917).
28 Id. at 800.
29 Id. (Emphasis added).
;0 Brown v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Ky. 1973); accord, Stone
v. Commonwealth, 418 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1967); Graham v. Commonwealth, 221
S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1949); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Marshall, 158 S.W.2d 137, 142
(Ky. 1942).
31 See Sylvester v. Casey, 81 N.W. 455 (Iowa 1900); Central Motor Co. v.
Gao, 94 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); United Iron Works v. Wagner, 167
P. 1107 (Wash. 1917).3 2 Note, Quotient Verdicts in Florida, 7 FLA. L. REV. 206, 207 (1954).3 3 Central Motor Co. v. Gallo, 94 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
34 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Marshall, 158 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1942); Comment,
Impeachment of Jury Verdicts by furors, supra note 1.
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trial, and in the exercise of an honest judgment of each juror as to
what verdict should be reached in justice to the rights of all parties
connected with the litigation.35
Quotient verdicts, it is argued, have the effect of foreclosing the
exchange of views and criticism among the members of the jury,
thereby circumventing the deliberative process. 36 As a result,
[t]he sentence which is ultimately imposed does not reflect the
single view of twelve men, but is simply the average of twelve dif-
ferent views which may be widely divergent and which have not
been subjected to criticism and analysis.3 7
A more concrete, if less persuasive, argument against the quotient
verdict is that it enables one or two jurors, by submitting unreason-
ably large or small numbers, "to exert inordinate and unfair influence
upon the amount of the quotient and thus bring about a verdict
which may be substantially out of line with the judgment of most
of the other jurors .. ."3 For example, if ten of the jurors feel that
the sentence in a particular case should be five years and the other
two jurors for some reason believe that 20 years is the appropriate
term, the resulting quotient will be seven and one-half years, a
figure 50 percent greater than the one preferred by all but two
of the jurors. Two factors, however, militate against the persuasiveness
of this argument. First, in the absence of strong prejudices on the
part of any of the jurors, it seems unlikely that such great differences
of opinion as to the length of the sentence will often exist. Second,
if such differences do exist it is reasonable to assume that either the
jury will become deadlocked, in which case there must be a new
trial anyway, or the jurors will agree upon a compromise figure not
unlike that which the quotient method would have produced.
The latter of these two factors is one of the few arguments pressed
in favor of quotient verdicts. It is contended that
[t]he taking of a quotient is a rough approximation of the de-
liberative process since discussion itself tends to neutralize extreme
views and produce an average of the jurors' initial opinions.39
Still, as seen above, the strongest argument against quotient verdicts
is based on legal principles rather than practical effects. The fact
that in a given situation the quotient verdict may closely approximate
35 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Marshall, 158 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Ky. 1942).
36 Id.; Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REv. 968, 985 (1967).
37 Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, supra note 36, at 985.
38 Annot., supra note 18, at 348; accord, Security Mut. Fin. Corp. v. Harris,
261 So.2d 43 (Ala. 1972). Killion v. Dinklage, 236 N.W. 757 (Neb. 1931).
39 Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, supra note 2.
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the verdict produced by careful deliberation makes it no less odious
when measured against those principles.
The only other noteworthy justification for the use of quotient
verdicts is founded on the assertion that "quotients are often used not
as a complete substitute for deliberation, but as a last resort after
protracted deliberation has failed to produce agreement."40 Even
granting the veracity of this statement,41 it still does not change the
fact that a true quotient verdict does not "reflect the single view of
twelve men ... ."42 Nor does it necessarily reflect the exact view of
any one of the twelve jurors. Furthermore, the inability of twelve
supposedly reasonable jurors to agree on a sentence after lengthy
deliberation is very likely a strong indication of the real necessity for
a new trial. To permit a quotient verdict in such instances merely
for the sake of judicial economy or the jurors' peace of mind would be
to work a paramount injustice.
lII.
The determination of the validity of quotient verdicts in a number
of states has historically involved the issue of whether or not a quotient
verdict is a verdict by lot. This is largely due to the existence of
statutes in these states in which one of the specifically designated
grounds for granting a new trial is that the verdict has been decided
by lot.43 In general, "lot" is defined as "a contrivance to determine a
question by chance or without the action of a man's choice or will."4"
Whatever else may be involved, a verdict by lot has one essential
characteristic-the element of chance. 45
The most clear-cut example of a verdict by lot is found in the
1833 New York case of Mitchell v. Ehle.46 In that case, after initial
deliberations had failed to produce an acceptable verdict, the jurors
placed ballots, some marked "prize" and some left blank, in a bat. It
40 Id.
41 See Thompson v. State, 270 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. 1954).42 Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, supra note 36, at 985.
43 Eleven states currently have statutes specifically referring to verdicts by lot
in criminal cases: Aauz. R. Cmi:. P. 310 (1956); Aam. STAT. ANN. § 43-2203
(1968); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1181 (West Supp. 1972); FLA. R. Cann. P. 1.600
(1968); IDAHO CODE § 19-2406 (1948); IOWA CODE ANN. § 787.3 (1950); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 29-24-02 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 952 (1958); S.D.
Coi fPnED LAws ANN. § 23-50-2 (1967); TEx. CODE Cm. PRo. ANN. art. 40.03
(1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-3 (1953). In addition, since 1958, four such
statutes have been repealed and replaced with more general provisions which do
not specifically mention verdicts by lot. The repealed laws are: Ky. Ca. CODE § 271
(1953); MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 94-7603 (1949); NEv. REV. STAT. § 175.535
1957); N.Y. CODE CMnm. P. § 465 (McKinney 1945).4 4 Arnold v. State, 233 S.W. 818, 820 (Ark. 1921).4
5 Blaylack v. State, 233 S.W.2d 615 (Ark. 1963).
46 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 595 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
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was agreed that if more "prizes" were drawn the plaintiff should win
and that if more blanks were drawn the defendant should prevail. As
a result of the drawing, the jury decided in favor of the defendant,
but the verdict was subsequently set aside as being the product of a
lottery. In this particular case the presence of the essential element
of chance is obvious.
In contrast, the presence or absence of the element of chance in
quotient verdicts is considerably more difficult to discern and has
therefore been a point of sharp disagreement between states in which
verdicts by lot are or were prohibited by statute. On the one hand,
the Supreme Court of Arkansas established the rule for that jurisdiction
when it held that:
[t]he quotient verdict is not the result of a lottery. It is a certain
result, ascertained by adding 12 separate amounts together and
dividing the total sum by 12. Only one result can be reached. It
would be a lottery, if 12 separate amounts were placed on separate
slips of paper and one slip then drawn out, which by agreement
should become the verdict.47
The Speer holding has been scrupulously followed in later Arkansas
cases 48 and, in one instance, has been adopted by the highest court
of Montana.49 In the recent case of National Credit Corp. v. Ritchey,50
however, the Arkansas Supreme Court indicated that it is now willing
to compromise its former position with regard to quotient verdicts.
While paying homage to Speer, the court distinguished between: (1)
those instances where the jurors agree to be bound by a quotient
before they determine and reveal their individual figures and, (2)
those instances where they agree to be bound only after arriving at
their individual figures and making them known to the other jurors.
(Note that in either situation the agreement to be bound by the
quotient precedes the actual calculation of the quotient.) The court
then concluded that, while the second of these situations creates a
mere quotient verdict, the first instance amounts to a verdict by lot
wherein "each juror is in a position to control the odds."51 Semantical
differences aside, this decision is significant in that it represents a
recognition by the Arkansas Court that at least one type of quotient
verdict is a verdict by lot.
47 Speer v. State, 198 S.W. 113 (Ark. 1917).48 Blaylack v. State, 370 S.W.2d 615 (Ark. 1963); Connelly v. State, 350
S.W.2d 298 (Ark. 1961).
49 State v. Moorman, 321 P.2d 236 (Mont. 1957).
5O 477 S.W.2d 488 (Ark. 1972).
51 Id. at 496.
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On the other hand, some jurisdictions with "verdict by lot" 52
statutes have long maintained that the true quotient verdict is a
verdict by lot. Devoid of the element of deliberate judgment by the
jurors, the quotient verdict is viewed by these states as no more than
"'the result of chance and self-imposed coercion .... "53 The history
of Kentucky's treatment of the problem of quotient verdicts is par-
ticularly noteworthy in this regard because it illustrates the modem
trend in legislation on verdicts by lot, if not the modem trend in case
law. Prior to 1962, the Kentucky statute pertaining to verdicts by lot
was section 271 of the Criminal Code of Practice. It stated that:
[t]he court in which a trial is had upon an issue of fact may grant
a new trial, if a verdict be rendered against the defendant, by
which his substantial rights have been prejudiced, upon his motion
in the following cases: ...
[3] If the verdict has been decided by lot, or in any other man-
ner than a fair expression of opinion by the jurors .... 54
Due largely to Kentucky's liberal provisions for "curing" quotient
verdicts, the Court of Appeals has seldom declared a verdict involving
the use of the quotient method to be a verdict by lot under this statute.
Typical of these pre-1962 cases is Graham v. Commonwealth55 wherein
the Court noted that the use of the quotient method in arriving at
verdicts "has been repeatedly condemned by us,"5 6 but concluded
that:
where it appears, as in the instant case, that the jury unanimously
agreed upon the guilt of the accused and then arrived at a quotient
verdict which was subsequently and independently adopted by
all the members of the jury,... the verdict is not one by lot within
the meaning of § 271(3) of the Criminal Code of Practice. .... 57
When faced with a true quotient verdict by Kentucky standards (i.e.
one in which the quotient was returned by the jury as its verdict
without a post-calculation ratification of the advance agreement),
however, the Court has declared it to be a verdict by lot.58
In 1962, the Kentucky Criminal Code of Practice was replaced by
the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure, and section 271 of the
52 See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Marshall 158 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Ky. 1942); West
v. State, 448 P.2d 131 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968); Phillips v. State, 216 S.W.2d 211
(Tex. Crim.App .1949).
r3"Louisvie & N.R.R. v. Marshall, 158 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Ky. 1942).5 4 
Ky. REV. STAT. CIuM. CODE [1960] § 27 (repealed 1962).
55 221 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1949).
56 Id. at 678.
57 Id.5
8 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Marshall, 158 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1942).
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old code was succeeded by rule 10.02. The new rule, which is far
more general than the old one, simply states that "the court may grant
a new trial for any cause which prevented the defendant from having
a fair trial, or if required in the interest of justice."59 Under this new
rule the Court is free to resolve the issue of justice or injustice without
being bound to the old mechanical test of whether or not a quotient
verdict has been sufficiently cured to escape classification as a
verdict by lot. However, in Stone v. Commonwealth6° and Brown v.
Commonwealth,61 both decided since the adoption of the new rules
of criminal procedure, the Court failed to note the statutory change.
Citing Graham62 and Stone as authority, the Court in Brown reas-
serted that:
[w]here it appears that the jury unanimously agreed upon the guilt
of the accused and then arrived at a quotient verdict which was
subsequently and independently adopted by all members of the
jury, the verdict was not "made by lot" and cannot be set aside on
that basis.03
In all fairness it must be noted that the Court reached this conclusion
in response to the defendant's specific contention that the verdict was,
in fact, made by lot. Notwithstanding that contention, it is submitted
that the Court could easily have taken judicial notice of the new law
and apprised the defendant that the existence of a technical verdict
by lot is not an express prerequisite for granting a new trial under
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 10.02.
In maintaining its traditional stance in Brown v. Commonwealth,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals has given rule 10.02 a very narrow
reading, at least with regard to quotient verdicts. In effect, it has said
that in most instances the use of the quotient method does not prevent
the defendant from having a fair trial and that the interest of justice
requires only that quotient verdicts be set aside when they are not
cured by subsequent agreement. The Court has therefore refused to
follow the lead of the more progressive jurisdictions and, in so doing,
has again failed to rid this state of an obscure but significant burden
upon the rights of the accused. Hopefully, the Court of Appeals will
not long continue to maintain its present position. The Court should
recognize that the use of the quotient method for any reason, at any
59Ky. R. ClaM. P. 10.02(1) (1962).
60 418 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1967).
61490 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Ky. 1973).
62 Graham v. Commonwealth, 221 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1949).63 Brown v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Ky. 1973).
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stage of the jury's deliberation, is a poor substitute for the careful
consideration of evidence and ideas. Having done so, the Court
should thereafter proceed at the first opportunity to render the use
of the quotient method obsolete in the state of Kentucky.
William M. Lear, Jr.
